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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a new twist in anonymous communication. The advent of
cyberspace enables anyone with basic reading and reasoning skills to send
thousands of anonymous messages with relatively little effort. Although
text-based electronic anonymous messages are not the only way to
communicate anonymously,' they are far simpler than the alternatives.
Sending truly anonymous messages in the physical world has always been
an expensive art; the sender must keep the message devoid of all
incriminating finger prints, telltale hairs or fibers, and other physical detritus
that could betray their identity. Furthermore, the message must be sent
from a location that cannot be traced back to the sender, and must consist
of materials that cannot be traced through the manufacturer or by region.
As 0. J. Simpson would likely attest, anonymous phone calls on cell phones
should be discouraged, especially when driving. Signals from 0. J.'s phone
passed through the nearest cells to the police as he drove down the highway
after his wife's murder, leaving behind a digital dotted line resulting in a
media spectacle highway chase.2
However, times have changed. Due to advances in technology and the
emergence of cyberspace, personal identities and physical locations are far
more easily cloaked in anonymity and pseudo-anonymity than ever before.
Although the technology that enables people to send anonymous messages
is still not as user-friendly,' vast improvements have been made since the
inception of cyberspace.
Anonymity can be seen as both a good thing and a bad thing for society.
Anonymity can be a benefit to society: systems of truly anonymous
communication, when used legally, provide a socially valuable service.
Indeed, anonymous political speech is considered to be a guaranteed right
and a cornerstone of American democracy. Anonymity also has nonpolitical, yet socially valuable, applications as well: for example, it is useful
when you "[k]now something dangerous about your local nuclear power
plant but don't want to risk getting run off the road by hired thugs."4 On
the other hand, when used illegally, anonymous communication can become

1. See Bruce P. Smith, Cybersmearingand the Problem ofAnonymous Online Speech, 18
CoMm. LAW. 3, 4 (2000).
2. See JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW: THE LAW OF THE INTERNET 139 (1997) (citing
The Simpson Murder Case; Fugitive ReliedOn and Was UndoneBy CellularPhone, L.A. TIMES,
June 19, 1994, at A 1l; PoliceLike to Listen In: Crime, CellularPhones Don't Mix, S.F. CHRON.,
June 21, 1994, at Al).
3. A. Michael Froomkin, FloorControlon the InformationOcean: Living With Anonymity,
Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 416 (1996).
4. See WALLACE WANG, STEAL THIS COMPUTER BOOK 80 (1998).
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a dangerous sword wielded by an invisible foe; government officials often
express concern that anonymous communication systems in cyberspace
thwart the efforts of law enforcement.' There are countless illegal uses of
anonymity in cyberspace. For example, "[c]yberpredators often cruise the
Internet in search of lonely, curious or trusting young people." 6 Illegal civil
activities abound as well: "[T]he Internet has enabled individuals easily to
widely disseminate misappropriated trade secret information. Once posted
on the Internet, it is difficult if not impossible to put the genie back in the
bottle."7 Despite these concerns, true anonymity itself is merely a catalyst
for speech: "[I]f anonymity encourages unwanted speech, it may also
encourage wanted speech." 8
When combined with the historical protections of political speech, the
modem pros and cons of anonymity raise a constitutional question: if
people acting anonymously in cyberspace cannot be held accountable for
their words, what type of protection should their speech have? Despite the
fact that truly anonymous and pseudo-anonymous communication has been
popular for hundreds of years, and although the First Amendment protects
freedom of speech, people are not guaranteed the right to say anything
without accountability. Accordingly, there have been several governmental
attempts to ban or curtail anonymous communication, in and outside of
cyberspace. For example, in 1996 the state of Georgia attempted to ban
cyberspace anonymity, and a section of the Federal Communications
Decency Act also attempted to bar citizens from communicating
anonymously in cyberspace. Both measures failed, as have other attempts.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on a narrowly tailored
statute restricting cyberspace anonymity, but due to the unique and
influential attributes of cyberspace, the opportunity may very well present
itself shortly.
Apart from banning cyberspace anonymity entirely, many critics of true
anonymity9 believe that there is not enough liability for operators of
anonymity systems. Their reasoning, in short, is that providing the masses
with easy access to anonymity is the same as "[a]ccording an anonymous

5. See Seth R. Lesser, PrivacyLaw in The InternetEra:New DevelopmentsandDirections,
607 PLI/PAT 141, 148 (2000).
6. Lizette Alvarez, House PassesBill to Crack Down on Pedophiles Exploiting Internet,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1998, at A16 (quoting Rep. Bill McCollum).
7. Robert C. Welch & Elia Weinbach, Protection of Trade Secrets And Confidential
Business Information in the Internet Age: A BriefOverview, 1166 PLI/CORP 225, 233 (2000).
8. Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L.
REv. 117, 144 (1996).
9. See infra, § II.D; see also Marie M. Stockton, Protecting Copyright in Cyberspace:
HoldingAnonymous RemailerServices ContributorilyLiablefor Infringement, 14 T.M. COOLEY
L. REv, 317, 321 (1997).
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user complete immunity from prosecution."'" Thus, these critics argue that,
if a person enables an illegal and untraceable communication, then that
person should be held liable for the result of the communication.
Most anonymous messages transmitted in cyberspace are now sent
through computers called "remailers," which strip the sender's address and
forward the message to the recipient. Remailers operate all over the world,
and are very inexpensive to create. The individuals who operate the
remailers (the "remailer operators"), are fierce advocates of free speech,
and most provide their services for free. Unfortunately, these services are
sometimes abused by people who send illegal or harmful messages. Because
the message recipients cannot identify the true sender of the message, they
often resort to attacking the remailer operator who has acted as a middle
man. Even with no legal ground to stand on, an angry recipient of an
anonymous message can strong-arm most remailers out of business.
The obvious result is that operators of true anonymity remailers often
shut down their services at the first sign of trouble, due to the liability
stemming from occasional user abuse of the system. This, in turn, creates
an atmosphere that lacks consistent, reliable anonymity systems available
at any given time for average citizens in legitimate need of anonymity. A
lack of reliable anonymity systems goes against the interests of the general
public. 1' Because of the social value of anonymity, true anonymity systems
that afford operators limited liability and are directed for use by the general
public should be encouraged.
But there is a fine line between permitting free anonymous speech in
cyberspace and enabling illegal and harmful anonymous acts, such as child
pornography. For this reason, I firmly believe that the need to catch
anonymous abusers after their first offense is as high a priority as the need
for limited liability for truly anonymous remailer operators. The crux ofthe
problem is the fact that it is impossible to guarantee that all first-time
anonymous abusers will be caught, as long as truly anonymous remailers
exist. But the reality of the situation is that truly anonymous remailers will
always exist, because they are inexpensive and simple to create.
Furthermore, although these hidden remailers may be hard for the average
person to find and use, criminals have an incentive to find them and figure
them out.
Therefore, a compromise between the need for remailers and the need
to catch criminals must be reached. Such a compromise must reflect a
realistic, good faith attempt to catch first-time abusers, while at the same

10. George P. Long, III, Comment, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace,
55 U. P1rr. L. REv. 1177, 1205 (1994).
11. But see infra, § II.D (referring to Marie Stockton's argument for remailer operator
liability).
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time enabling truly anonymous, easily-accessible remailers to exist. At this
point in the development of anonymity systems, "[i]nformation privacy is
a social goal, not a technological one."' 2 Therefore, the encouragement of
limited liability for operators must come from law-making bodies, such as
Congress and courts. Pamela Samuelson eloquently stated that "[t]o
achieve information privacy goals will require social innovations, including
the formation of new norms and perhaps new legal rules to establish
lines between acceptable and unacceptable uses of personal
boundary
13
data."
These new legal rules that Samuelson speaks of can be developed
through the evolution of basic principles of corporate law. I propose the
creation of a new corporate structure for remailers, and I further propose
that the United States government provide remailer operators with a safe
harbor in which to operate. This proposal will result in limited liability for
remailer operators, and will fundamentally alter the relationship between
remailers and governments, and remailers and average citizens in legitimate
need of anonymity. Because the privilege of limited liability in my proposal
hinges upon cooperation and not upon forcing truly anonymous remailers
to become pseudo-anonymous, remailer operators should be willing to
coordinate their efforts, band together with the government, and help track
down anonymous abusers.
The current remailer situation is relatively chaotic. Critics attempt to
seek out and destroy the few remaining remailers, which only drives them
further underground. Many scholarly proposals attempt to protect truly
anonymous remailers by turning them into pseudo-anonymous remailers.
My proposal will enable truly anonymous communication to flourish, while
providing law enforcement with the powerful tool of operator cooperation
that currently does not exist. The end result will promote free speech, and
combat crime more effectively. Although it goes against the current status
quo, I believe that my corporate structure/safe-harbor proposal is the best
solution to the many problems of anonymity in cyberspace.
This Article will examine the success and failure of past and present
boundary lines and advances in cyberspace anonymity systems, and will
consider the future of non-remailer anonymity in cyberspace such as
possible peer-based anonymity message alternatives like Gnutella and
Crowds. Furthermore, this Article will propose a template for a new
generation ofcyberspace anonymity systems that provides continuous, free,
unlimited true anonymity to the masses through remailers while shielding
the operator from liability and enabling governments to track and catch
anonymous abusers.
12. Pamela Samuelson, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?Privacy as
Intellectual Property?,52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1169 (2000).
13. Id.
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ANONYMITY

Anonymous or pseudo-anonymous text messages are not, of course, the
only way to communicate anonymously. However, as one scholar on the
subject succinctly points out,
[T]hose who insist on speaking anonymously in public settings are
aberrations: the terrorist in a balaclava; the racist hidden by a white
hood; or the mob informant whose on-air identity is obscured by
shadows. In turn, with the exception of certain authors, long-haul
truckers, and graffiti artists, the use of pseudonyms in daily life
[outside of cyberspace] is also relatively rare.' 4
Although anonymity can be broken down into several shades or
categories,' 5 essentially the two main forms of anonymity are "true
anonymity" and "pseudo-anonymity." Therefore, and in part due to the
text-only parameters set by the technology of anonymous remailers, this
Article will focus on text-based, truly anonymous messages.
Perhaps due to the allure and promise of the term "anonymity," many
Internet-users who are not technologically savvy sometimes confuse
systems that provide true anonymity with systems that provide only pseudoanonymity, to their detriment. This confusion can lead to serious problems,
because people who think they are acting truly anonymously may say and
do different things than people who realize that they are only acting
pseudo-anonymously.
An excellent example of a highly misleading commercial system that
promises true anonymity but in reality offers only pseudo-anonymity is the
"VoiceFive.com FuturEsq" Internet research project,' 6 directed towards
law students. For a chance to win a thirty thousand dollar scholarship, law
students can "passively participate" in ongoing Internet research. FuturEsq
collects and aggregates data to "help companies understand how law
students collectively surf, shop, and research on the Internet." Despite the
fact that the research process is described as "completely confidential and
anonymous," the company's system is anything but anonymous. The fact
that FiveVoice.com claims "law students across the country are
comfortable with our privacy principles" only goes to show that bodies of
the general public that should know how to read fine print sometimes fail

14. See Smith, supra note 1, at 4.
15. Froomkin divides anonymity into four categories: traceable anonymity, untraceable
anonymity, traceable pseudonymity, and untraceable pseudonymity. See Froomkin, supra note 3,
at 417-22. These distinctions are not relevant for the scope of this Article.
16. See http://www.voicefive.com/futuresq/a/privacy.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).

AN EAMINATON OF THE POSSIBILITIES AND PERILS

to do so. VoiceFive.com's "anonymous" privacy principles, as described in
their own privacy statement, consist of the following:
VoiceFive may monitor all the Internet behavior of your
Household's registered computers. VoiceFive monitors both the
normal web browsing you perform, and also the activity you may
have through secure sessions, such as when filling a shopping basket
or checking out from online shopping. VoiceFive's technology
allows us to see the details of secure pages.

•.. [T]he registration process has a step that configures your
browser and computer so that your Household's Internet
communications are routed through our high-performance network.
The configuration process includes inserting a unique identifier into
your browser that enables us to confidentially monitor your
Household's Internet behavior.'
The bottom line is that VoiceFive.com collects reams of data regarding
the daily habits of their users, and ties this data to the identities of the users.
This interaction is not at all "anonymous," despite the fact that it is so
labeled by VoiceFive.com. In an even greater departure from true
anonymity, and despite their initial assurances to the contrary,
VoiceFive.com does not keep users' personal information confidential:
While we do not sell any personally identifiable member
information, we may share personal identification information with
third parties that help us deliver part ofthe VoiceFive service to you.
This includes companies that administer the VoiceFive sweepstakes
and individuals that you refer to us as part of the refer-a-friend
program. When we do this, we establish controls and legal
agreements that govern the use of that member information. These
companies are obligated not to use the information for purposes
other than to serve VoiceFive, and not to release the information,
unless you have entered into a relationship with a specific company
that would directly allow them to do so.

17. Id.
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... Our employees are obligated to abide by our internal security
policies and procedures to further safeguard the information. We
take privacy protection very seriously. All employees are made
of our privacy statement and have agreed in writing to follow
aware
8
1

it.

So only VoiceFive's employees, third party associates, and refer-afriend targets know the confidential, anonymous identities of their clients.
This fine print is typical of an Internet system that promises true anonymity
on its main page, but in reality only provides pseudo-anonymity to its
users.' 9 This example helps illustrate the potential problems innocent users
can encounter when they think they have true anonymity, and expresses
why an easy-to-understand electronic system that actually provides true
anonymity to the masses is a useful and much needed tool.
In truly anonymous communication, the author of the message is not
known and cannot be discovered by anyone else. Conversely, the author of
pseudo-anonymous communication is discoverable or perhaps known by
others, but not generally by everyone. For example, if Alice sneaks up to
Bob's house in the dead of night with no one watching, and leaves no trace
of herself as she slips a fingerprint-free, unsigned message under Bob's
door, that message may be truly anonymous.2" However, if Alice signs the
message with a pseudonym that only Bob recognizes, then the message is
pseudo-anonymous. The same concepts apply to electronic anonymity in
cyberspace: a message that arrives from a neutral remailing service,21
stripped of all identifying marks except the contents of the message itself,
is truly anonymous so long as its path cannot be traced back through the
remailing service to the original sender. Use of cryptography can help cloak
the sender's identity to any eyes that may read the message, but it is not
strictly necessary to send an anonymous message.22
A. Anonymity Outside Cyberspace
Anonymous action is as old as the concept of identity. However, it is an
age-old question as to how much legal protection "should be accorded to

18.
19.
See id.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
The privacy statement for VoiceFive is an example of an agreement with such fine print.
See Froomkin, supranote 3, at 418.
See infra, § III, Anonymity Remailers.
See SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE

TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (1999).

SCIENCE OF SECRECY FROM ANCIENT EGYPT
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a person's thoughts, sentiments, and emotions."23 Today, McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm 'n24 is the case that has come to stand as the backbone for
modem First Amendment protection of true anonymity. In McIntyre, the
Supreme Court ruled that Ohio's statutory prohibition against distribution
of any anonymous campaign literature violated the First Amendment. 5
In the United States, anonymous and pseudo-anonymous political
speech have been popular for hundreds of years, and identity-cloaking
authors have made rich contributions to the political discourse. 6 During the
American Revolution it was common to use nicknames and codes when
sending letters. In 1735, after publishing pseudo-anonymous essays, John
Zenger was arrested for seditious libel, tried, and acquitted."' Thomas
Paine's Common Sense was first published as written by "An Englishman,"
and even some authors of the Federalist Papers used anonymous names; as
the famous footnote six from McIntyre states:
That tradition [of true anonymity with respect to political speech] is
most famously embodied in the Federalist Papers, authored by James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, but signed "Publius."
Publius' opponents, the Anti-Federalists, also tended to publish
under pseudonyms: prominent among them were "Cato," believed
to be New York Governor George Clinton; "Centinel," probably
Samuel Bryan; "The Federal Farmer," who may have been Richard
Henry Lee, a Virginia member of the Continental Congress and a
signer of the Declaration of Independence; and "Brutus," who may
have been Robert Yates, a New York Supreme Court Justice who
walked out of the Constitutional Convention. A Forerunner of all of
these writers was the pre-Revolutionary War English pamphleteer
"Junius," whose true identity remains a mystery. The "Letters of
Junius" were "widely reprinted in colonial newspapers and lent
considerable support to the revolutionary cause.""

23. SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 18 (1964)

(referencing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890)).
24. 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
25. Id.
26. Jonathan D. Wallace, Nameless in Cyberspace; Anonymity on the Internet, 54 CATO
INST. BRIEFING PAPERS 2 (December 1999).
27. See id.
28. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6 (citations omitted).
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When combined with the new technologies of cyberspace, this rich
history of anonymous communication faces a revolutionary new set of
challenges.2 9
B. Anonymity Today
The bold tradition of anonymous communication continues today in
cyberspace, where sending anonymous messages has become very popular.
Unlike Harvard and other schools that prevent unidentified people from
utilizing their computer networks, Geoffrey Stone, Provost of the
University of Chicago, opened the university's networks for anonymous use
because he reasoned that "people should have the right to communicate at
the university anonymously, because the First Amendment to the
Constitution guarantees the same right vis-A-vis governments."3 In 1999,
many Kosovars and Serbs used anonymous cyberspace communication to
send and receive political news without risking their lives; if governments
had access to the true identities of these message senders, entire families
would have been in grave danger.3 1
Furthermore, other users of anonymity, such as crime witnesses,
novelists, on-line therapy group members and corporate whistle blowers are
among the socially valued and constitutionally protected beneficiaries of
truly anonymous communication. These users are considered necessary
elements of society. In support of privacy of communications, Judge Posner
argued that "there is no reason to believe that on average more false than
true disparagements are made in private conversations, and the true are as
likely to be suppressed by the prospect of publicity as the false. 32
1. Abuse of Anonymity
Unfortunately, some people abuse public anonymity systems by
engaging in criminal actions such as large-scale intellectual property theft,
financial crimes, copyright infringement, cyberstalking threats, child
pornography, and even terrorist instructions.33 Cyberspace has enabled a
new virtual frontier for computer crimes. In terms of dollars, and regardless
of anonymity, "one estimate is that a crime committed with a handgun
results in a theft of $1,900 on average, whereas a crime committed with a

29. See Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and International Law Enforcement in
Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 243 (1996).
30. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 26 (1999).
31. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 64
(2000).
32. Tien, supra note 8, at 144 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 173
(1981)).
33. See Edelstein, supra note 29, at 250-51.
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computer results in a theft of $450,000 on average. ' 4 Anonymous hackers
routinely target, enter and deface or steal from the computers of the New
York Times, The White House, Senate, and FBI. 35 Lawsuits and legal
actions abound; disgruntled employees and "pissed-off investors" who
attempt to act anonymously are "increasingly likely to be sued for libel by
image-conscious companies., 36 Even the Federal Security Service, formerly
the K.G.B., has recently revived the cold-war tactic of relying upon
anonymous accusations against Russian citizens. 3" "Federal law
enforcement estimates indicate that more than $10 billion in [electronic]
data is stolen annually in the United States, '3s and anonymity plays a role
in enabling the perpetrators.
These abuses of anonymity will continue, despite scholarly proposals
that advocate "provisions [that] would deter harmful anonymous acts by
putting the perpetrators on notice that they will be more easily identified in
the future. 39 People who want to commit "harmful anonymous acts" will
commit them regardless of the deterrents proposed. Furthermore, as will be
discussed at length below, outright prevention of anonymous
communication is technologically impossible. One scholar's assertion that
"[b]y preventing individuals from hiding behind anonymity, there can be an
assurance of accountability" fails to recognize this fact.4°
2. Response to Abuses
In response to abuses of cyberspace anonymity, both the U.S. Federal
Government as well as some state governments have addressed, to various
degrees, the unique issues related to anonymity in cyberspace. Furthermore,
the popular media and scholarly literature have embraced the topic, and
discussions concerning the implications of widespread cyberspace
anonymity have become commonplace.4 '

34. Stockton, supra note 9, at 319 n.12 (citing CompaniesResist High-Technology Theft,
RISK MGMT., Apr. 1, 1995, at 14, 1995 WL 12528346).
35.

WINN SCHWARTAU, CYBERSHOCK: SURVIVING HACKERS, PHREAKERS, IDENTITY THIEVES,

INTERNET TERRORISTS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DISRUPTION 155 (2000).
36. Alicia Ault, "Fire"In A Crowded Chat Room, WIRED MAG., Apr. 2001, at 66.
37. Michael Wines, Reviving a Tactic, K.G.B. HeirActs on Anonymous Accusations, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2001, at A5.
38. Edelstein, supra note 29, at 251 (citing Clinton Wilder & Bob Violino, Online Theft:
Trade in Black-Market Data is a Growing Problemfor both Business and the Law, INFO. WK.,
Aug. 28, 1995, at 30).
39. Noah Levine, EstablishingLegal Accountability for Anonymous Communication in
Cyberspace, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1996).
40. Michael H. Spencer,Anonymous InternetCommunication and the FirstAmendment: A
Crackin the Damn of NationalSovereignty, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 24 (1998).
41. See e.g., David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity,
Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
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There are two distinct approaches that critics can take when they
address the abuse of anonymity in cyberspace: the technological side, and
the legal side. Some commentators believe that the technological side ofthe
debate is the most important battle between free speech advocates and antianonymity crusaders. A technological battle involves "the ability of
remailers to strip messages of their identifying information, of Internet
consultants to mine sites for content and electronic footprints, and of
encryption specialists and code breakers."42 As will be discussed in greater
detail later in this Article, I believe that the technological side of the
remailer battle has already been fought, breakthroughs and limitations have
been acknowledged by both sides, and the evolution of remailer theory and
practice has hit a brick wall. As it now stands, technological innovations
and remailer war tactics only go as far as the remailer operator's stamina
in the face of a legal challenge. In short, the technological battle is over.
Meanwhile, the legal side of the debate rages on. It remains an open
legal question exactly what forms of anonymous communication the U.S.
Constitution protects, although it is generally agreed upon that the
government cannot directly ban all forms of anonymous communications." 3
As a general rule, it can be inferred that the "First Amendment prevents the
outlawing of true anonymity, although it only prevents governmental
interference with anonymous messages." The theory behind this reasoning
is that access to methods of anonymous communication is vital for
promoting and protecting socially important forms of free speech.
C. A ConstitutionalQuestion"5
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads in part that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
' The Amendment "was designed to prevent the majority, through
press."46
acts of Congress, from silencing those who would express unpopular or
' The Amendment's purpose is to encourage
unconventional views."47
formation of public forums "into which messages may be inserted without

42. Smith, supra note 1, at 9.
43. See generally George F. du Pont, Comment, The Criminalizationof True Anonymity in
Cyberspace, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (2000-01), available at http://www.law.
umich.edu/mttlr/volseven/duPont.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
44. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, andAccountability: Challenges to the
FirstAmendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641 (1995).
45. Much of the constitutional analysis contained in this section is adapted from my earlier
published short article entitled The Criminalizationof True Anonymity in Cyberspace. See supra
note 43. For a more in-depth constitutional analysis of anonymity in cyberspace, please refer to
this work.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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censorship."4' Although most courts and commentators agree that
protecting freedom of speech is important to foster the marketplace of
ideas,49 practitioners also recognize that the First Amendment does allow
some regulation that may limit free speech. In other words, the Amendment
does not guarantee individuals freedom of speech without accountability in
all cases.
Historically, legislative attempts to ban anonymous communication has
met with varying degrees of success. Anti-anonymity legislation targeted at
cyberspace has been particularly unsuccessful, due to the general First
Amendment protections on free speech. Legislators and government
officials ignorant of the day-to-day fundamentals of the Internet too often
overreact to perceived cyber threats stemming from the unique and still
undefined long-term nature of cyberspace. As a result, several recent antianonymity statutes have failed. Meanwhile, government reports addressing
anonymity and the threats it poses have yet to provide concrete solutions
to these problems.
1. Attorney General Report
Opponents of limited liability for remailer operators support the
Attorney General's August 1999 report on cyberstalking, because it
recognized several possible dangers stemming from true anonymity.50 The
report went so far as to recommend that state legislatures create statutes
addressing the problems of true anonymity, but it failed to offer specifics
regarding exactly how to word such a statute.5 In the end, the report
recommended that federal law be "amended to make it easier to track down
stalkers and other criminals in cyberspace while maintaining safeguards for
privacy," but its specific prescription included only an amendment to the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and failed to propose large-scale
legislative solutions.52
2. A CL U v. Miller
Perhaps this failure to provide new legislative solutions is due to lack of
success of past attempts. For example, in 1996 the Georgia State legislature

48. Branscomb, supra note 44, at 1676.
49. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
50. See 1999 Reporton Cyberstalking:A New ChallengeforLawEnforcement andIndustry,
A Reportfrom the Attorney Generalto the Vice President,(Aug. 1999), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
51. See id. (stating "[c]are must be taken in drafting cyberstalking statutes to ensure that
they are not so broad that they risk chilling constitutionally protected speech, such as political
protest and other legitimate conduct").
52. Id.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 6

passed by an overwhelming margin a statute specifically aimed at combating
anonymity in cyberspace53 The Georgia law made it illegal for any person
to knowingly transmit data through a computer network if that data used
individual names to falsely identify the person or entity sending the data.54
Although Georgia claimed that the legislation prohibited only "fraudulent
transmissions or the appropriation of the identity of another person or entity
for some improper purpose,"55 the District Court of Georgia found the
statute was "over-broad and threatened irreparable harm to the plaintiffs
from continued self-censorship.,1 6 The statute was overturned.
3. Decency Regulation
A similar federal statute met the same fate as the Georgia statute. This
statute, under Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is known as
the "Communications Decency Act of 1996."" The purported goal of the
law was "to regulate the access of minors to 'indecent' and 'patently
offensive' speech" in cyberspace." Because "[a] child with minimal
knowledge of a computer, the ability to operate a browser, and the skill to
type a few simple words [such as 'dollhouse' or 'toys'] may be able to
access sexual images and content over the World Wide Web,"59 the
Communications Decency Act required people transmitting any content in
cyberspace to verify the age and identity of all potential recipients of
"indecent" material.60 Opponents of the law claimed that the Act violated
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, because it "would
have destroyed the anonymity that is a hallmark of online
communications." ' In its first opinion involving cyberspace,62 the Supreme
Court ruled that the online censorship provisions of the Communications
Decency Act were unconstitutional.

53. See Donald J. Karl, Note, Comments & Legislative Reviews, State Regulation of
Anonymous Internet Use After ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 530 n.179
(1998) (referring to GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-9-93.1(a) (Harrison 1997)).
54. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1(a) (Harrison 1997).
55. ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
56. Karl, supra note 53, at 527 (citing ACLU, 977 F. Supp. at 1235 (enjoining Ga. from
enforcing the anti-anonymity act)).
57. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997).
58. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
59. Id.
60. See generallyReno, 521 U.S. 844; see also Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC
HailsSupreme CourtInternet "Indecency" Decision: Opinion "PreservesBoth Free Speech and
PersonalPrivacy,"available athttp://www2.epic.org/cda/epic supctstatement.html (June 26,

1997).
61. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 60.
62. See id.
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4. Supreme Court Stance on Cyberspace Anonymity
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to
consider a narrowly tailored statute restricting cyberspace anonymity,63 the
expanding nature of cyberspace may present the Court with an anonymityrights question in the near future. However, the Court has commented on
the nature of communication in cyberspace. In its opinion striking down the
Communications Decency Act, the Supreme Court noted that cyberspace
constitutes "a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication ... located in no particular geographical location but
available to anyone, anywhere in the world."' It also noted that cyberspace
"can hardly be considered a 'scarce' expressive commodity" because "[i]t
provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all
kinds., 65 "Scarce" expressive commodities, such as radio and television
frequencies, have limited bandwidth 66 and are therefore subject to stricter
government regulation. This suggests that while not supporting the notion
of true anonymity at all costs, the Supreme Court believes that cyberspace
should, more so than other mediums of speech grant a wide latitude in the
realm of First Amendment rights.
D. Scholarly Opinions
Scholars have weighed in on both sides of the issue. Many noted
scholars in the field of anonymity are strongly opposed to truly anonymous
communication in cyberspace.
Professor Trotter Hardy poses perhaps the most significant argument in
the legal literature for a total statutory ban on anonymous remailers in
cyberspace. 67 Hardy recognizes that the vast majority of truly anonymous
communication in cyberspace arrives from anonymous remailers, and he
concludes that "the only effective deterrent to the problems of anonymous
remailers will be toprohibitthem altogether.6 ' He even concedes that he
prefers the admittedly "rather drastic solution" of complete prohibition of
anonymous remailers to the lesser evil of imposing strict liability on the
remailer operator.69
Other critics of true anonymity take Hardy's less drastic approach, and
believe that there is not enough liability for operators of true anonymity

63. See Karl, supra note 53, at 533.
64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 850-51.
65. Id. at 870.
66. See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 23-24 (Alfred A. Knopf 1995).
67. See Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 993,
1050 (1994); see also du Pont, supra note 43.
68. See Hardy, supra note 67, at 1051 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
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systems. Marie Stockton advances the argument that anonymous remailer
operators "should be held contributorily liable for [copyright]
infringement." 70 The unacceptable alternative, she argues, is to "pursue no
legal redress at all." 71 To gain a full understanding of Stockton's argument,
it is important to note that it is based upon the incorrect assumption that
criminals are the only people who use truly anonymous communication:
It is this author's contention that the only people who really need to
obtain untraceable electronic anonymity are individuals who have
illegal motivations.72
[U]sers who have legitimate reasons for wanting to send
anonymous messages are free to seek out a remailer service that
provides both traceable anonymity and has a reputation for not
disclosing
the identities of its users unless compelled to do so by
73
law.
Similarly, George P. Long sees only the criminal uses of anonymous
communication. He believes that providing easy access to anonymity in
Cyberspace is the same as "[a]ccording an anonymous user complete
immunity from prosecution., 74 Long argues that such immunity would
eventually lead to the creation of "havens for criminal activity... [that
would] not only subvert any positive, humanitarian purpose that might
come from such a [system], but it would also run counter to the law's
views regarding anonymity. 75
On the other hand, scholars such as Jonathan I. Edelstein support
anonymity systems for the masses. Edelstein contends that "[a] complete
ban on anonymous remailers, as some authorities have advocated ... would
have a drastic chilling effect on legitimate political, therapeutic, and
recreational uses of the Internet." 76 Edelstein states that there should be
"absolute protection of anonymity in messages which express political or
religious opinions," and that "the confidentiality of persons participating in
on-line self-help or therapy groups should also be preserved. 77 The

70. Stockton, supra note 9, at 321.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 321.
73. Id. at 328.
74. George P. Long, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1177, 1205 (1994).
75. Id.
76. Edelstein, supra note 29, at 275-76.
77. See id. at 277.
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Supreme Court reflected Edelstein's position in its 1995 decision in
McIntyre holding an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution ofanonymous
campaign literature unconstitutional.7"
Despite abuses ofanonymous communication by people who break laws
and harm others, and despite governmental and scholarly concern over
these abuses, individuals cannot be legally or technologically barred from
sending anonymous messages. Moreover, many governments and scholars
recognize the importance of assuring the general public easy access to
anonymity systems. Of course, by the term "general public," I mean the
non-hacker community. Computer hackers have historically been able to
cloak themselves in true anonymity in cyberspace, and will continue to do
so in the future regardless of government regulation or any noisy academic
opinion. Hacker activities do not affect my proposal because "what hackers
do doesn't define what the effect of law as code is on the balance of the
non-hacker public."79 Therefore, this Article is directed towards anonymous
messages sent by the non-hacker, civilian people who rely on more
conventional and less technical methods of interaction. Because of
anonymity abuses (hacker and non-hacker alike), and despite the benefits
and legal protections for anonymity, the major obstacle of remailer operator
liability still threatens to seriously hinder the continuation ofeffective public
anonymity systems in cyberspace.
III. ANONYMITY

REMAILERS

The most common device through which anonymous messages are sent
is called a "remailer." Remailers are computers located throughout the
world that strip messages of the sender's name and address, and forward,
or "re-mail" them to the recipient. Anyone can send a message plus a
forwarding address to a remailer, and the remailer will deliver the stripped
down message to the address. Furthermore, anonymous remailers are
exceptionally easy to set up: one of the "original universal remailers
matured from concept to completion in a single afternoon. The operation
of an anonymous remailer has been described as 'trivia[ly] easy"'go by John
Helsingius, an early remailer pioneer.8 ' It is also inexpensive by organized
crime's standards: in his operational heyday, Helsingius spent
approximately five to seven hundred dollars monthly to maintain and
operate his service. 2 When a message is sent through several remailers in

78. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
79. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1408 n.17
(1996); see also du Pont, supra note 43, at n. 139.
80. Edelstein, supra note 29, at 266.
81. See infra, § III.A.
82. See Edelstein, supra note 29, at 266.
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a row before it arrives at its destination, it can become truly anonymous. 8 3
Only access to each one of the remailer's files can betray the original
sender's true identity, and the majority of respectable remailer operators do
not keep records, or if they do, they do not release them.
All of this anonymous communication has created a major obstacle for
remailer operators: more and more irate recipients of offensive or illegal
anonymous communications are attacking the remailer operators that pass
on the messages. Some scholars even question whether a firm that has been
anonymously attacked must "file a lawsuit and subpoena [the remailer's]
records in order to determine the true identity of the harasser."" The
answer is no. Subpoenas are neither the sole nor the most effective manner
to obtain information from a remailer and bring it to its knees. The dilemma
increases when the communication is so anonymous that even the remailer
operator does not know the identity. An injured party's only recourse in
such a situation is directly against the remailer itself.
Therefore, despite the fact that remailers are very easy to set up and
operate, 5 lawsuits from injured parties or strong-arm tactics from
government agencies such as the FBI have created an exceptionally
negative atmosphere for remailer operators. Whenever a remailer is forced
to divulge the identity of an anonymous message sender, that remailer's
reputation as a reliable system for anonymity is immediately tarnished.
However, remailers that do not keep transmission records are often forced
to close under the threat of operator liability if they continue operating. As
one scholar points out, "a legal regime which places vicarious criminal
liability on operators whose services are abused by criminals would make
operation of anonymous remailers impractical, if not impossible" and
"would have the same practical effect as an outright ban on anonymous
remailers." 6
The result is that remailers, which can serve a valuable and
constitutional purpose to the entire population, often fold under the
pressure applied by governments or a few disgruntled recipients.8 7 As a
result, most remailers are created and operated by hackers and technology
enthusiasts who are willing to risk lawsuits and strong-arm tactics from
government agencies for the public good or for more personal reasons.
While these services are valuable, they are often unreliable and technically
confusing for those who need them most because at any given moment it
is unclear which remailers are operating, or where they can be found. Even

83. See Froomkin, supranote 3, at 418.
84. See Mike Tonsing, The 'Network ofNetworks'Begets Opportunities and Challenges Or,
Roadkill Prevention in the Information Age, 47 FED. LAW. 18, 19 (2000).
85. See Edelstein, supra note 29, at 265-66.
86. Id. at 277.
87. See id. at 275-79.
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web sites dedicated to providing the general public with directories of
available remailers are consistently outdated on a daily basis. One famous
remailer directory located at www.publius.net, referenced in countless law
review articles about remailers, has not been updated since August 6,
1998.8 Furthermore, once a member of the general public does locate a
remailer, it may remain unclear how to operate them easily and effectively,
or to determine exactly the degree of anonymity they will ultimately
provide.
It is true that "very effective Internet anonymity requires only two
things: cryptographic tools, and willing remailer operators." 9 Early on,
remailer operators were more than willing; they were dedicated to their
service because they believed in access to true anonymity for all. Although
cryptography became and remains an integral component of remailer
operation, the continued success of remailers hinges upon the willingness
of the operators. As one scholar put it, "[t]he key here is to have implicit
faith and trust in the people operating the service." 90 In a disclaimer entitled
"Trust No One," Zero-Knowledge Systems, 9' a peer-based anonymity
system in cyberspace acknowledges that one of its "system deficiencies" is
that "users must trust Zero-Knowledge to not record any association"
between them and a user.92
Recently, that vital public trust has been widely eroded as remailer
operators become less than willing to protect their users in the face of
liability. While most remailer operators consider hacker attacks and other
cyber-troublemakers to pose an exciting challenge to their technical skills, 93
few are willing to assume liability for the contents of the messages that
cross their systems. This burden of liability is presently so strong that true
anonymity remailers cannot operate for an extended period of time; most
shut down shortly after they are created. As a result, most current remailers
are either not true anonymity remailers, or are so technically complicated
that the average citizen in need of true anonymity is effectively unable to
use them. Below is a brief outline of remailer evolution.

88. See http://www.publius.net/rlist.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
89. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 424.
90. SCHWARTAU, supra note 35, at 156.
91. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
92. Russell Samuels & Ed Hawco, White Paper;UntraceableNym Creationon the Freedom
2.0 Network, at 8, availableat http://www.zeroknowledge.com/alternate/policy.asp (last modified
Apr. 1,200 1).
93. See David Mazieres & M. Frans Kaashoek, The Design, Implementationand Operation
of an Email Pseudonym Server, Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 1 (1998), available at http://www.lcs.mit.edu/impact/perspective
?name=9901 (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
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A. Early Remailers
The first "anonymous" remailers, created in 1988,"4 were actually
traceable pseudo-anonymous remailers because they kept some record of
the sender's identity. Most of the early users wanted to post anonymous
messages to electronic bulletin boards, such as Usenet's
"alt.sexual.abuse.recovery," and did not mind that they were technically not
acting anonymously. However, this world of pseudo-anonymous bliss came
crashing down in February 1995, when the Finnish police obtained a
warrant to search the user logs ofthe most famous first-generation remailer
pioneer, "anon.pennet.fi."
As it turned out, someone had posted anonymous messages to the
bulletin board "alt.religion.scientology" that contained copyrighted and
trade-secret information from the Church of Scientology. These documents
contained the secret core beliefs of the Church of Scientology; only the
deeply committed, true believing members of the church who paid their way
to the top were permitted access to the documents. High-level
Scientologists were worried that non-true-believers would misinterpret the
documents and misjudge the Church of Scientology. 95 Scientology officials
contacted Interpol, which in turn enlisted the aid of the Finnish police. John
Helsingius, the computer scientist who operated anon.pennet.fi,
surrendered the identity of the anonymous poster, believing that the only
alternative would have been to watch the police seize the entire database.96
While it operated, anon.pennet.fi offered accessible, pseudo-anonymity
to the masses for free. However, when confronted by the Church of

94. See Edelstein, supra note 29, at 245.
95. The documents explained that,
[t]he final (secret) stage of [Scientology] asserts that in fact people are
composed of clusters of"thetans" that are the spirits of dead space aliens, who
were brought to earth 75 million years ago by an evil intergalactic tyrant named
Xenu, and who were killed [by him] with hydrogen bombs in volcanoes. These
spirits were captured afterwards by Xenu on electronic ribbons, and were given
implants that kept them from remembering any of this. Since each of these
thetans has a reactive mind, "auditing" must be performed on all of the millions
or billions of these to get them to "blow" (be exorcised), at which point the
primary (or operating) thetan controlling the body will realize his godhead, with
power over matter, energy, space, and time (MEST), including the power to
create galaxies and life." According to the documents, the easiest way to blow
the alien spirits from your body is to join the Church of Scientology.
See Scientology FAQs and General Information, availableathttp: //www.factnet.org/Scientology/
scifaq.htm; see also http://pw2.netcom.com/-seekon/summaryframe. html.
96. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 422.
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Scientology, it cracked under pressure. A few months later, public distrust
forced the shut down of the remailer. Currently, the anon.penet.fi web site
contains the following statement, posted in 1996:
Anon.penet.fi is closed! News: Service now totally closed! Despite
the service being almost closed, and only providing a very minimal
service to support some especial (sic) groups and enabling people to
re-establish other communication channels, it was still continuously
attacked by spanmers sending hundreds of thousands ofjunk mail
messages - causing a lot of costs! Because the totally clueless
abuse by the scum junk mailers, I now have to close down even the
restricted form of the service :-(... Due to both the ever-increasing
workload and the current uncertain legal status of the privacy of email in Finland, I have closed down the anon.penet.fi anonymous
forwarding
service.... Thank you for a very interesting time on the
97
net!

B. Remailers Evolve
After witnessing the hard lessons learned by the first generation of
remailers operators, remailers began to evolve into a second, wiser, and
tougher generation. A recent second-generation98 remailer experiment,
"nym.alias.net," purposely picked up where the first generation ofremailers
left off. Dubbed an "untraceable" remailer and created by MIT graduate
student David Mazieres and his advisor Professor M. Frans Kaashoek,
nym.alias.net operated for two years and attempted to overcome what its
creators identified as the two main types of attacks on remailers: attempts
to expose anonymous users, and attempts to silence them." Mazieres and
Kaashoek recognized that certain types of remailer use, such as electronic
eavesdropping, cripplingly heavy traffic, and offensive hacker attacks could
"either force an anonymous server to shut down or else destroy its utility
to other people."'"
Although nym.alias.net operated as a standard remailer in that it stripped
all messages of their identifying addresses and forwarded them towards
their assigned destinations through a chain of other remailers, it also
incorporated "several technical innovations" that made it less vulnerable to
97. See http://www.pennet.fi (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
98. Second generation remailers are often called "type-2" remailers.
99. David Mazieres & M. Frans Kaashoek, The Design, Implementationand Operationof
an Email Pseudonym Server, Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security 1,available at http://www.lcs.mit.edu/impact/perspective?nane=9901
(last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
100. Id. at 2.
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attack than earlier remailers.'0 Mazieres and Kaashoek attempted to
accomplish three goals with nym.alias.net: first, to build a remailer that
could be used and abused by "people outside of computer science research"
(otherwise known as civilian, often quasi-technophobic individuals);
second, to protect the secrecy of the identities of the users even if the
remailer computers are compromised by outside parties; and third, to
provide a robust anonymous email service that "people can rely on."' 2
The nym.alias.net project accomplished most of its goals. Examples of
the types of attacks nym.alias.net encountered and overcame include:
"Exponential mail loops" and "bulk mailing pyramid schemes, " or
piles ofemail specifically intended to flood the server. Their solution: limit
the amount of mail any given account can send or receive each day;
"Mail-bombs," or batches of mail arriving at a faster rate than the
server can manage, intended to overload the server. Their solution: limit the
rate at which any person can send mail to the server;
"Reverse Mail-bombs," or email sent to nym.alias.net's own "Help
Desk" requesting a response in the name of an innocent third party. When
the third party received the mail from nym.alias.net, many became annoyed
because they believed that nym.alias.net was sending them junk mail. Their
solution: the next time a reverse mail bomb is sent, blindly expose the
requesting party's true email address to the injured third party, and let the
two parties resolve it;
"Encrypted mail-bombs," or encrypted batches of mail arriving at a
faster rate than the server can manage, intended to overload the server.
Their solution (despite the fact that they do not know whether this ever
occurred): requires users to confirm reply blocks, 0 3 forcing the sending
computer to confirm every message it sends, thereby complicating the
attack "enough that other misuses of the system become easier," thereby
luring troublemakers away from sending encrypted mail-bombs;
"Creationofmany accounts,"which result in slowing down the server.
Their solution: require reply block confirmation. (Creation of many
accounts did not become a major problem due to the time-consuming
nature of physically creating new accounts.);

101. Id. at 1.
102. Id. at 3.
103. A "reply block" is a simple concept executed in an exceedingly complicated manner.
Essentially, it is a partially encrypted piece of information that, in the right context, points towards
the identity of a message sender. A somewhat simplified analogy is that examining a reply block
is like examining a small portion of a mysterious person's fingerprint. Depending on the path the
message traveled, it may be impossible to discover the identity contained in the reply block, just
as it may be impossible to discover who left a fraction of a fingerprint. A reply block is only one
piece of the puzzle of a sender's identity, and is of little use without other data located outside of
the remailer.

20011

AN EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBIUTIES AND PERILS

"Spare, "orjunk email that annoys recipients. Despite knowledge that
loads of spam were flowing through the server, Mazieres and Kaashoek
refused to filter mail based on content, because this would amount to
censorship. The result was angry recipients of spam could not contact the
anonymous sender, so they took out their anger on the remailer. Several
remailers in the nym.alias.net chain were forced to shut down due to too
many complaints. Their solution: block all "blind carbon copies" so
addressees could see who else was receiving the spain, and create "spain
traps" that entice mail to be delivered to them, then temporarily cut off the
account of anyone sending mail to those traps;
"INN Exploit," or password stealing. Essentially, hackers could take
advantage of a bug in a popular computer program called INN by tricking
the program into sending a computer owner's secret passwords to the
hacker through nym.alias.net. Their solution: install an outgoing
exponential mail loop from computers using INN. Although as many as 512
passwords may have been stolen before the exponential mail loop kicked
in, once in place it stopped passwords from reaching the requesting
hackers, and instead bounced the passwords to the surprised computer
owners.l14
While nym.alias.net's mission did not focus on the actual liability of
remailer operators, the data it collected on how to ward off various attacks
directed towards remailer functionality and how to maintain a user-friendly
service continues to be of vital importance to development of the remailer
community. For example, nym.alias.net developed useful ways to avoid
keeping user logs. It was the existence of user logs that destroyed
anon.pennet.fi; governments and angry recipients of anonymous messages
often demand that remailers keep logs of the true identities of their users,
but logs are inherently dangerous to the anonymity of the users and the
longevity of the remailer service. Instead of keeping logs, nym.alias.net
simply exposed repeat abusers upon request, or terminated offending
accounts. Once nym.alias.net was made aware of an abuse, it began
automatically attaching the offender's true email address to the messages
before they were delivered to the victim.' ° During this process,
nym.alias.net never kept a record of an abusive sender's identity. Although
this identity exposure betrays the user's assumption of anonymity and goes
against the spirit of anonymous remailers, it is considered an appropriate
way to combat without storing every single identity in a user log.
However, the nature of nym.alias.net's successes highlight one of the
project's biggest failures in its two years of operation: it was not strongly
challenged by the government, and operator liability never became an issue.
The closest Mazieres and Kaashoek came to a government shut-down was
104. See Mazieres & Kaashoek, supra note 99, at 10-15.
105. See id. at 17.
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when "one of their worst nightmares" came true: a user posted child
pornography with a nym.alias.net alias. As Mazieres and Kaashoek tell it,
The FBI contacted us. They sent a subpoena. We complied, and
disclosed the reply block for the nym. Of course, a reply block
doesn't necessarily give one the identity of a user. What we turned
over to the FBI can only have helped if they used it to issue more
subpoenas.' °
Because nym.alias.net did not keep user logs, Mazieres and Kaashoek
could not identify the child pornographer. Had the pornographer acted
again using the same alias, his true email address could have been
recorded onto his message and sent along with it. However, this did not
happen because the pornographer did not strike again via nym.alias.net.
In a comment that reflects the dangerous reality of operating a remailer,
Mazieres and Kaashoek expressed relief that they escaped liability
relatively easy, compared to the histories of past remailer operators:
The experience was not as bad as we had feared. The FBI did not
seize our equipment. They did not threaten us or try to intimidate us.
They did not ask us to start keeping logs, or try to convince us to
shut down. We feared child pornography more than anything, but
this happened and nym.alias.net survived." 7
Despite the fact that nym.alias.net did not face major liability challenges,
it collected very useful operating data that must be incorporated into any
future generation remailer.
C. Advanced Remailers Today
Remailers operating today take full advantage of the lessons learned
during the last decade and a half of evolution. Currently, truly anonymous
remailers are classified as "Mixmaster" remailers, which rely on high levels
of encryption, and require users to install anonymizing programs on their
computers. It is interesting to note that the system employed by Mixmastertype remailers is so securely anonymous that it is actually impossible for a
message recipient to reply to a message sender. The unfortunate result is
that anonymous two-way transactions over the Internet generally require
the use of a public forum meeting place, or use of a pseudo-anonymous
remailer, such as a remailer that keeps some form of identity logs. 8

106. See id. at 16.
107. See id.
108. See Edelstein, supra note 29, at 243 n.69.
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Hyper-cautious users can go even further into the world of absolute
anonymity if they create their own "Nymserver" or "Newnym." They must
simply establish a false email address that forwards messages to a real
address via a chain of "cypherpunk" remailers that reencrypt the message
between each remailer.'09 Advocates ofthis method of anonymity note that,
"if done properly, it is nearly impossible to trace." However, the problem
is that laypeople cannot even begin to "do it properly," much less
comprehend what the instructions mean, and therefore risk exposing
themselves. In a document entitled "Nym Creation For Mere Mortals," a
remailer-information site attempts to "explain in great detail how to set up
an account . . ., complete with examples and sample syntax." Despite
helpful walk-throughs such as this, it remains a challenging task for a
minimally computer literate individual to secure an anonymous "nym. '
Ironically, even The Complete Idiot's Guide to Protecting Yourself
Online warns users of the complicated nature of remailers. "The more
complicated the remailer, the more secure it is and the harder it is for
anyone to trace your address. If you're super-paranoid, you have to do a
bit more work because you'll want to use super-secret remailers."''" This
in turn begs the question, exactly how well will a "super-paranoid complete
idiot" be able to send an anonymous message?112
The bottom line is that truly anonymous remailers, as they exist today,
are elements of highly complex systems that are constantly in danger of
being shut down. Current systems may work for individuals well versed in
remailer and Internet technology, but these systems do not provide the
general population with reliable, easy to attain, true anonymity.
IV.

REMAILERS EVOLUTION

HITS A WALL

Up until now, and despite their liability problems, remailers have
continued to evolve and adapt in a series of generations based upon
technological breakthroughs." 3 While technological advances will certainly
continue,1 4 the present major technological remailer evolution has reached

109. See

SCHWARTAU, supra note 35, at 158.
110. See Anonymity: Index, available at http://www.stack.nVgalactus/remailers.indexanon.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
111. See Preston Gralla, The Complete Idiot's Guide to Protecting Yourself Online,
MacMillian Computer Publ'g, Ind., 1999, at 128.
112. My proposal, infra § V, takes even these poor souls into account.
113. See supra § III.B (referring to the nym.alias.net experiments and solutions, which are
excellent examples of these technological breakthroughs).
114. "As Moore's Law continues its relentless journey into the realm of the smaller, cheaper,
and faster, the acceleration of new technology introductions will increase." See Larry Downes &
Chunka Mui, Unleashingthe KillerApp; DigitalStrategiesfor Market Dominance, 1998 HARV.
Bus. SCH. PREss 28-29.
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a plateau. Today, minor technical advances are only appreciated or
comprehended by extreme enthusiasts. Meanwhile, the new liability
pressures faced by remailers are far harder to overcome than the past
barrage of hacker attacks. True anonymity remailers are useful while they
exist, but most crack under the pressure of operator liability. As a result,
the standard remailer model as a reliable true anonymity tool for the masses
has failed.
The new weak link in the remailer chain is the actual person who
operates the remailer, and no technological innovation can change their fear
of liability and repercussions. Michael Froomkin commented that in the face
of strict liability for remailer operators, "most reasonable people" would
likely decide that continued operation of their remailer would be "an
unacceptable risk."' " Froomkin imagined several related "creative lawsuits"
that remailer operators might reasonably have to face, including a common
law tort of concealment of the sender's identity, 1 6 a claim of conspiracy
with the sender," 7 and a RICO claim." 8 Of course, these creative lawsuits
may never succeed, but they raise valid issues and could cost remailer
115. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 425.
116. See id.at 426.
117. Froomkin notes that,
[a] conspiracy charge would be difficult since it would [be] difficult to prove the
element of agreement [between the message sender and the remailer operator]
that is a necessary part of a conspiracy. It is difficult to say that Bob conspires
with a stranger, even if he leaves a tool lying in plain sight, knowing that
criminals are likely but not certain to come by and use it. If Bob is really ignorant
of the identity, content, and purposes of the messages he retransmits, he can
plausibly say that there is no agreement between him and the conspirator, and
that he should be no more liable for the misuse of his remailer than the rental car
company that leases'a car to a terrorist.
Id.
118. "A RICO claim against a remailer could also founder on the lack of agreement." Id. at
426.
The circuits conflict as to whether a defendant must agree to 'personally
commit' the predicate acts in a RICO conspiracy but none of the circuits have
done away with the need for some sort of agreement between the parties to the
conspiracy. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold
that the defendant's agreement to personally commit RICO predicate acts is not
required ....According to these circuits, the government need only prove that the
defendants directly or indirectly conspired to conduct RICO activity. The First,
Second, and Tenth Circuits require the government to prove that the defendant
agreed to 'personally commit' two or more predicate acts in a RICO conspiracy.
Id. at 426, n.93.
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operators money to defend, and therefore act as a deterrent." 9 Creative
lawsuits aside, actual lawsuits are booming; one scholar writing for the
American Bar Association exclaimed that "[w]e are seeing an explosion
around the country of libel-lawsuits that would never have been brought
before, that get down to what I would call the trivial and the mundane
because now many trivial and mundane comments are being broadcast."' 2 °
Unfortunately, hypothetical lawsuits, neither trivial nor real, can be
prevented based solely upon advances in technology. As Froomkin stated,
"in the absence of... a jurisdiction capable of offering a safe haven for

remailers, the cornerstone of Internet anonymity currently relies entirely on
the kindness of strangers."'' It is now time for the strangers to assume
identities, and for the remailer industry to undergo a further evolution. The
evolution of remailers will remain stagnate, regardless of further
breakthroughs in technology, until the new weak links gets the attention
that they desperately need: operator liability protection.
V. THE EVOLUTION MUST CONTINUE: MY PROPOSAL FOR OFFERING

Based upon the above analysis, there are several economic disincentives
to maintaining remailers: they do not make money, and they expose their
operators to legal liability. If individual remailers could operate free of
liability, they would be able to exist beyond their first subpoena or angry
FBI visit, become easy to locate for the users who need them most, and
even have the potential to make money by displaying advertisements to
their users.
Many commentators have already proclaimed that the recent business
revolution on the Internet has ushered in a need for a "corresponding22
development of revolutionary new legal theories to govern its use."'
Although creating a liability-free remailer may seem impossible to many, it
may just be as improbable as creating a new form of corporation, as David
G. Post proposed in 1996:123
Corporation law has a long history of attempting to strike [a balance
between costs and benefits], and I propose that we begin developing
a form of corporate law for cyberspace, rules regarding the

119. See id.at 426.
120. Jeffrey Ghannam, Libel Online: Suit Raised Issue of Protectionfor Anonymous Web
Comments, 87 ABA J. 28 (Mar. 2001).
121. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 427.
122. Jay Eisenhofer & Sidney S. Liebsman, Caught by the Net, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct.
2000, at 40, 46.
123. See Post, supra note 41.
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formation of these entities and the protections that they will be
afforded, in order to completely address the (seemingly
unrelated)
24
speech.
anonymous
of
regulation
the
of
question
Although Post did not spell out the details of his proposed cyberspace
corporate form, his idea to develop concepts of corporate limited liability
for cyberspace-oriented businesses is an excellent one. Post noted the
"'democratizing' impulse" that is an integral byproduct of the Internet, and
stated that his proposal was only strengthened by the "relatively sudden
increase in each individual cyberspace citizen's ability to participate in
25
public collective action without formalities or legal barriers of any kind."'
With a nod to the evolutionary history of the corporate form, 26 Post
commented on the future of anonymity regulation and proclaimed that,
"[]ust as the doctrine of corporate limited liability itself developed as a
means of encouraging individual entrepreneurial participation in the
economic life of the nation, so too should the benefits of these new forms
of public participation be weighed carefully before adopting any regulation
[hindering or eliminating the use] of anonymity.
The next question therefore becomes: how elaborate does this
hypothetical new corporate structure have to be to achieve its goals? Even
the most basic corporate structure has historically afforded its managers
and directors limited liability for their actions on behalf of the corporation.
For this reason, I believe that a limited liability remailer could be created
from several corporations working in conjunction with each other, each one
"owning" and operating a single hard drive over which anonymous
messages could be sent. The end-users of the system would not care which
hard drive remailed their message; they would simply select one from the
pool. Any subpoena for a sender's identity would involve only the hard
drive that sent the message, enabling the other hard drives to continue with
the remailer's business. I believe that this system would leave remailer
operators free of liability because it would be absorbed by the individual
corporation that owned the hard drive. Furthermore, the system would have
a greater chance of weathering legal attacks, because even if the
subpoenaed hard drive was physically removed and placed in a police
124. Id. at 161.
125. Id. at 164.
126. See id at 164 n.55 (citing Stephen B. Presser, Thwartingthe Killing ofthe Corporation:
Limited Liability, Democracy,and Economics, 87 Nw. U.L. REv 148, 155-56 (1996)) (discussing
the historical background of adoption of limited liability statutes); Stephen B. Presser, Piercing
the Corporate Veil S 1.03, at 1-14 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993); Paul Halpern et al., An
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in CorporationLaw, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 118-19
(1980) (discussing the arguments in support of limited liability in England regarding its expected
effects on the "investments of savings by the middle and working classes").
127. See Post, supra note 41.
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evidence room, the rest of the hard drive pool would continue operating
and the remailer would not shut down. This corporate structure, if feasible,
would be a breakthrough in the field of cyber-anonymity, and could provide
the first reliable limited liability remailer system to the masses.
This proposed corporate structure may be overly complex, have too
many variables, and if used by itself might not serve its intended goal of
providing guaranteed liability protection to remailer operators. Therefore,
I believe that the best approach to the question of limited liability for
remailer operators is to consider this new corporate structure, and at the
same time directly address the issue of liability head-on, however unpopular
or unorthodox a concept.
Curtis Karnow did just that when he proposed legal recognition of the
"e-person" as a way to assure legal rights for individuals who act in
cyberspace. The concept behind an "e-person," which currently exists only
in theory, is essentially an anonymous or pseudo-anonymous identity used
in cyberspace with the legally recognized right to establish credit and
conduct business much like any other naturalized individual. 28 Although the
concept of the e-person is admittedly far-fetched, Karnow's proposal
indicates a movement towards recognition of the unique nature of
cyberspace. Taking all of these considerations into account, I believe that
the most effective way for remailer operators to attain limited liability is for
the United States government to grant them limited liability in a safe
haven, in exchange for co-operation.
This brings us to the next controversial issue: co-operation with
remailers. True anonymity remailers exist because the public trusts them.
The day the public loses trust, the remailer ceases in utility as a system for
anonymity. As a result, there are two cardinal rules that are simply not
broken by remailer operators, because it would destroy their credibility and
user base. First, remailer operators never control or monitor the content of
the message sent across their services.'29 Second, operators of true
anonymity remailers never keep user logs. Any proposed limited liability
system must respect and preserve these two cardinal rules. I believe that the
creation of a new corporate form specifically tailored to limit remailer
operator liability, combined with a guaranteed safe haven for remailers in
exchange for co-operation, may be the winning combination for the next
successful generation of remailers because it provides safety valves for the
government without breaking the cardinal rules.
My proposal would conflict with few current laws. Perhaps most
importantly, few statutes, if any, stand in the way of limited liability for

128. See id. at 168 n.63 (citing Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self" FleshingOut the
Rights ofElectronic Personalities,13 J.MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFo. L. 1, 4 (1994)).
129. See Froomkin, supranote 3, at 425; see also infratext accompanying note 151.
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remailer operators who abide by the two cardinal rules.130 Nevertheless,
critics often argue that, no matter what the system, someone has to be liable
for anonymous offenses. In the absence of the offending3party's identity, the
remailer operator is often called upon to take the fall.' '
Critics ask me: Why does it have to be all about remailers? Perhaps
another remailer revolution is a misdirected approach to the problem of
continued access to true anonymity in cyberspace. Certainly, there are other
ways to forward the cyberspace anonymity causes, without going through
the trouble of creating new corporate structures and an entire new area of
limited liability. Remailers are not the only way to send anonymous
messages in cyberspace; as long as Alice is not recognized by her neighbors
or her stalkers, she can go to a public library or local cyber-cafe and create
a free Hotmail.com email account under a false name, and send anonymous
emails that can only be traced back to that computer! But Alice must once
again be careful not to leave any fingerprints, and she should wear a fake
mustache or make sure there are no hidden security cameras that could
betray her identity if traced.
Obviously, technology can replace a fake mustache. There are remailerfree ways to use cyberspace to send anonymous, untraceable messages. For
example, people can use "peer based" networks such as Gnutella,Crowds,
and Aimster to send anonymous messages. However, it still remains to be
seen whether these peer-based systems provide liability-free, true
anonymity.
Peer-based networks are essentially huge groups of computer
enthusiasts all over the world who leave their computers running a special
cyberspace network program day and night. Anyone with the right
technology may join a peer-based network; a peer may even live next door
to you. These systems operate much like the now-infamous Napster
software networks, except without the central directory hub. In the Napster
network, a user contacts Napster.com and asks the central computer if it
knows about anyone who has a specific song on their hard drive.'3 2 If the
central Napster computer knows where the song can be found, it connects
the person requesting to the person who listed the song. One person then
downloads, via the Internet, the song directly off the other person's hard
drive (i.e., the song is not stored on Napster's computer).

130. "It does not appear that third party system operators or administrators have a statutory
duty to disclose, orto refrain from disclosing," an anonymous message sender's identity. See Post,
supra note 41, at 139 n.30.
131. For an in-depth analysis of all of the arguments brought up in this section, see infra, §
VI, Examining My Proposal.
132. This is what got Napster in trouble; it was accused of aiding and abetting intellectual
property thieves.
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Peer-based systems are almost identical to the Napster system, with one
major exception: peer-based systems have no central computer. The result
is that the legal risk of operating a peer-based system is minimized "because
their operators will have no practical means of knowing what type of
information is exchanged" across the system.' 33 People using Gnutella or
Aimster who want to download a song just send an email out into the void
of cyberspace to about seven other random people running Gnutella or
Aimster networking programs, and each recipient either replies in the
affirmative or forwards the message to the same amount of different people
on the network, minus one. Any number between two and seven will work,
but anything higher can potentially create exponentially large requests,
flooding the Internet with trillions of requests and slowing down the
network. In the end, the message bounces around to thousands of "peers"
in the system, but because of the network design, no peer knows for sure
where the original message originated. All they know is that the request
came from another member of the network, but they do not know which
one, since any given message is equally likely to have originated from any
given member of the network. Of course, the message had to originate from
someone in the peer group, and that cuts down the possible message
senders to the finite number of peers in the system. As one expert on peerbased systems pointed out, a peer list must include everyone in the world
for any given message receiver to have zero information on the message
sender.134 Fortunately for members of peer-based systems, there are already
enough other peers in the system for a message originator to be nearly
untraceable.
A few corporations have already embraced the concept of commercial
peer-based anonymity systems: a Canadian company called ZeroKnowledge Systems unveiled a peer-based network called "Freedom,"' 35
a few British programmers have unveiled the peer-based "Freenet"
network, and even AT&T is experimenting with a peer-based anonymity
service called "Publius" operating over the Crowds network.136 All of these
services enable people to send truly anonymous, untraceable messages to
anyone in the world. This has sparked strong reactions from other
companies and the government. Edgar Bronfman, the president of Seagram,
133. Robert Batchelder, Commentary: Record Labels in DenialAbout Peer-to-Peer,Special
to CNET New.com, available at http://www.news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-201-4824189-0.html
(Feb. 14, 2001).
134. See Michael Stutz, Anonymity by Degrees, WIRED NEWS.COM, 13 (1997), availableat
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,1282,7331,00.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
135. See Courtney Macavinta, New Product Guarantees Online Anonymity, CNET
NEWS.COM, at 5, 2 (1999), available at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1006-200-149 1501 .html
(last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
136. John Borland, AT&T Developing Web Anonymity, Anti-Censorship Tool, CNET
NEWS.coM, June 30, 2000, at 1.
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which owns Universal Studios and the Universal Music Group, reacted by
declaring that "We must restrict the anonymity behind which people hide
to commit crimes. As citizens, we have a right to privacy. We have no such
right to anonymity.""'3 The United States Department of Justice contacted
Zero-Knowledge and requested that they build in a secret "back door" to
their "Freedom" network. Zero-Knowledge declined.'
Even the people who created these anonymity systems have reservations
about their use. It remains an open question as to what AT&T will do with
its Publius network. 3 9 When America Online discovered that programmers
at its Nullsoft online music division had created Gnutella as a development
project in early 2000, the company immediately shut the project down. 40
However, before they could contain the software, someone set Gnutella
free on the Internet and it quickly spread through the open-source
community."' Adam Shostack, director oftechnology for Zero-Knowledge
Systems, stated that "We're glad to see people are doing this kind of
research, but I would like to see someone come up with a way to enable the
good things
to happen and put some kind of way in to block the bad
' 42
things.'

The solution to Mr. Shostack's dilemma has already been implemented
in the Zero-Knowledge System policies: their peer-based network keeps a
form of logs that, with enough manpower, can be pieced together to find
the identity of an anonymous offender. In a statement intended to notify
users of Zero-Knowledge System's privacy philosophy and policies, the
company warned that:
A concerted court ordered attack on multiple Freedom Server
Operators [i.e., peers], could result in a nym's pseudonymity being
compromised. If multiple server operators were forced to reveal
their encryption keys, it would be possible to determine a particular
nym's e-mail address or IP address. In addition, a sufficiently
powerful organization could, if so desired, retrieve the informational
content of mail sent to regular Internet users by monitoring Internet
network access points around the world. Each of these attacks

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 2.
See Macavinta, supra note 135, at 2.
See Borland, supra note 136, at 2.
See id.
See id. 117.
Id. 20.
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would require significant resources in order to pursue and force the
revelation of keys controlled by third-party Freedom Server
Operators. 43
'
Although peer-based networks can be used to create a nearly
unstoppable, nearly untraceable anonymity system, the peer members of
these networks may, in time, face similar liability issues as remailer
operators. Despite the fact that there is safety in numbers, there is also the
risk of group-wide action; peer-based anonymity networks are essentially
complex remailer systems, and if exposed to liability, individual members
of peer-based networks may choose not to remail anonymous messages.
Eventually, peer-based anonymity systems may fail as members of peerbased networks realize that they need the same operator liability protection
this Article proposes for remailers. Furthermore, although companies like
Zero-Knowledge can shut off a pseudonym if it is used to commit a
crime,'" the lack of a single operator of a peer-based system makes it very
difficult for the government to actually catch second-time anonymous
offenders who change their pseudonyms.
VI. EXAMINATION OF MY PROPOSAL
Despite the promises and possibilities ofpeer-based networks, I believe
that remailers provide the simplest, most accessible form of anonymity in
cyberspace. Furthermore, remailer technology and its use has developed to
a point where the addition of limited operator liability is all that is needed
to revolutionize the industry and dramatically effect positive change in how
individuals communicate anonymously. Therefore, my proposal focuses on
remailers. Because remailers are constantly threatened with closure, and
due to the societal value of remailers, I propose that remailer operators be
afforded limited liability.
Anonymous remailers are similar to Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
such as America OnLine (AOL), because they both act as an intermediary
for user communication. ISPs were recently threatened with the same issue
of operator liability, and eventually won limited liability. In the early 1990s,
two cases came down on either side of the issue of ISP liability: in Cubby,
Inc. v. CompuServe Inc, 45
' the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the ISP Compu-Serve was not liable for disparaging
statements posted to an online news gossip site because as a "distributor,"
it had "little or no editorial control" over the contents of the gossip site.

143. ZeroKnowledge Freedom Privacy Policy, available at http://www.freedom.net/
freedomprivacy.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
144. See Macavinta, supra note 135, 13.
145. 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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However, in Stratton Oakmontv. ProdigyServs. Co., 146the Supreme Court
of New York held that the ISP Prodigy was liable for disparaging
statements posted to an online news site because as a "publisher," it
"exercised a degree of editorial control" over the contents of the news
site. 47
In response to ISP uncertainty as to where they stood in terms of
distributor or publisher liability, Congress modified Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act to "effectively immunize [ISPs] from liability
for information originating with third-party users of the service.""'
Furthermore, recent court decisions use the common law to uphold the
thrust of Section 230 retroactively: in Lunney v. ProdigyServs. Co., the
New York State Court of Appeals concluded that under a common law
qualified privilege, Prodigy was protected from liability for transmitting
email because
it "'was not a publisher of the electronic message board
50
messages."1
As a result of these ISP liability protections, targets of anonymous
messages have "tended to view [ISPs] and operators of online message
boards as allies rather than adversaries."'' Remailer operators need the
same kind of public recognition. Arguably, because remailer operators, as
a rule, exercise absolutely no control over the messages sent across their
computers, they too should be seen as distributors who "are only liable for
defamation if they know or have reason to know of the defamatory
article,"' 5' and should be given limited liability as well.
However, there is one major difference between ISPs and remailers, and
this difference is the lynchpin of critics' arguments: unlike ISPs which
ultimately have access to the name, email address, Internet protocol
address, and credit card number of their users and can hold them
responsible for their illegal actions in the face of a subpoena,' 53 remailers
cannot hold any anonymous first-time offender accountable. Therefore, the

146. 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
147. Smith, supranote 1, at 6.
148. Id.
149. 723 N.E.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1832 (2000).
150. Smith, supra note 1, at 6.
151. Id. (emphasis added). However, note that because "many cybersmearing cases are
dismissed or settled once the company identifies the anonymous speaker,.. . the claims asserted
by corporate plaintiffs seldom have been litigated to judgement." Id. at 4.
152. See Christopher Butler, Plottingthe Return ofan Ancient Tort to Cyberspace: Towards
a New FederalStandardofResponsibilityforDefamationforInternet
Services Providers,6 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 258 n.77 (2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581
cmt. d (1976)).
153. "Although most online providers agree to protect the privacy of their subscribers, the
applicable service terms and privacy policies usually permit the provider to disclose subscriber
information in response to a subpoena duces tecum." Smith, supra note I, at 6.
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argument goes, if remailer operators are not held liable for offending
anonymous messages, then no one will. 4
This argument is flawed, because it is entirely possible to subscribe to
an ISP under a false identity, and remain an uncaught first-time offender.
Of course, such an undertaking would require planning and strategy, due
to an ISP's ability to trace credit card payments, and the occasional ability
to trace the sender's Internet protocol address to a physical spot.
Nevertheless, ISPs do not always know the identities of their subscribers,
and they are not themselves held liable for that mistake. In Zeran v.
America OnLine, Inc.,' the plaintiff injured by anonymous speech from an
ISP subscriber "was left without recourse once the court held AOL to be
immune from liability as a distributor of third party information content
because the messages had been posted by an anonymous person whose
identity was never able to be traced."' 56
Although all criminals should be held accountable for their actions, we
must not destroy all true anonymity systems in the process. The only way
to guarantee true anonymity in specific instances is to offer it in all
instances. To judge whether or not a specific message of a sender's speech
will qualify for constitutional protection and true anonymity would require
exposure of the content of the speech. This exposure is antithetical to the
very essence of true anonymity, and must be avoided in order to preserve
anonymity for those who need it. The right to act anonymously "cannot be
preserved if it must first be bargained for on a case by case basis."'5 7 Many
forms of anonymity are guaranteed by the First Amendment, and
anonymous remailers are so vital to that guarantee that they must be
preserved through limited liability to their operators.
Despite the fact that some criminals will abuse the system and get away
with it, my proposal will enable socially desirable free speech and
anonymity to flourish, and at the same time ensure that repeat anonymous
abusers are caught and dealt with at higher rates than before.
My proposal of limited liability for remailer operators raises three issues
that must be addressed.
In the first issue raised by my proposal, critics may attempt to apply to
remailer operators the argument that ISPs do not need substantial liability

154. See Welch & Weinbach, supra note 7, at 234. As the court noted in Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1255-57 (9th Cir. 1995), "[t]he
anonymous (orjudgment proof) defendant can permanently destroy valuable trade secrets, leaving
no one to hold liable for the misappropriation."
155. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
156. Butler, supranote 152, at 260.
157. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace,28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1000 (1996).
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protection from private individuals harmed by anonymous postings." 8 Some
critics of ISP limited liability already commute their analysis to local
bookstores and other "distributors of speech," and their next logical step is
to oppose limited liability for remailer operators:
It is hard to justify the current regime [of ISP limited liability] when
one considers the fact that a large corporation like AOL is
immunized from liability for distributing defamatory materials while
the neighborhood bookstore is not. ISPs have become one of our
greatest distributors of speech, and it seems both inefficient and
unjust to hold them to a lower standard of liability for defamation
than all other existing distributors.

... [A] federal standard imposing some liability [on ISPs] is now
necessary because we have a federal, largely court-imposed,
standard for ISPs barring virtually all liability.'59

In response to this first issue, the "non-scarce" nature of cyberspace has
irreparably changed the game. ISPs and remailers, truly global in their
nature, neither act like, nor are subject to, the same rules as neighborhood
bookstores. It is because ISPs are "one of our greatest distributors of
speech," and therefore it is necessary to hold them to a lower standard of
liability. Furthermore, anonymous remailers are arguably our greatest
distributor of speech, and therefore remailer operators need the highest
level of liability protection. While it may be hard for an individual to employ
tactics that would shut down AOL, it is altogether too easy for an
individual to shut down an anonymous remailer. Therefore, the hard-fought
limited liability protection ISPs currently enjoy should extend to remailer
operators. In the second issue raised by my proposal, critics could attempt
to delay and confound my proposal by bogging it down in the age-old 60
debate of the absence of territorial boundaries and law in cyberspace. To
briefly recap highlights from the debate: some scholars believe that
cyberspace is truly a lawless new frontier, separate from physical society.
In 1996, David Johnson and David Post proclaimed that "efforts to control
the flow of electronic information across physical borders - to map local
regulation and physical boundaries onto Cyberspace - are likely to prove

158. See Butler, supra note 152, at 265 (stating "[i]t is far from clear that ISPs need
substantial protection against private individuals").
159. See id.at 265, 271.
160. In Cyberspace time, "age-old" means the past decade.
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futile... United States Customs officials have generally given up.'' In
support of this argument, an excellent pseudo-anonymous Harvard Law
Review article on the laws of cyberspace reiterates Professor Larry Lessig's
belief in "the possibility that legislators will never be able to draft legislation
generally applicable to the slippery contours and variegated usercommunities
of cyberspace without butting up against First Amendment
162
concerns."'
However, along a more centrist approach, Lessig does recognize that
law can exist in cyberspace, and that during its infancy it should "evolve
slowly through a careful application of common law principles, with
particular attention paid to the aspects of cyberspace that make Internet
transactions unique.' 63 In sharp contrast, Judge Frank Easterbrook believes
that while cyberspace is indeed unique and novel, the law can take its
nature into account. He also states that no unique niche should be carved
out of the law for all things cyberspace, any more than a unique niche
should be carved out of the law for all things horses.'6
In response to this second issue, and regardless of the theoretical
concepts of law and territorial boundaries in cyberspace, my proposal
works in real space, on real soil and in real courts because remailers are
physical machines and remailer operators are human. If the United States
provided a safe harbor for remailer operators, then all of the world's
governments could work with the operators to catch repeat offenders. No
rational remailer operator 65 would actively protect an anonymous offender,
because they would risk losing their safe harbor and their limited liability.
Instead, remailer operators would help the government examine the
patterns of first-time offenders, and prove vital to catching second time
offenders. In short, granting limited liability to remailer operators, and
making them allies instead of adversaries,''would create an environment
in which productive, socially desirable free speech and anonymity could
flourish, while ensuring that more anonymous abusers were caught and
dealt with than ever before.

161. David Johnson & David Post, Symposium: Surveying Law and Borders, Law and
Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1372 (1996).
162. Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law - The Law ofCyberspace, 112 HARV.
L. REv. 1574, 1582 (1999).
163. Id. at 1583 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Symposium: Emerging Media Technology and the
FirstAmendment: The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE LJ. 1743, 1745 (1995)).
164. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspaceand the Law ofthe Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207, 208.
165. "Rational remailer operator" may currently be a contradiction in terms, but with the
availability of safe harbors and limited liability, I predict that an entirely new breed of remailer
operators will emerge.
166. See Smith, supra note 1, at 6.
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In the third issue raised by my proposal, many critics demand that all
anonymous abusers be caught and dealt with after theirfirst offense, not if
and when they repeat their offense, and that under my proposal most firsttime abusers would get off scot-free. There are several different schools of
thought to address the difficulty of catching first-time offenders.
A. Government Chip Proposal
Some scholars propose that the United States government mandate all
new computer devices be outfitted with a chip that attaches the user's
identity to every outgoing message. For example, Edelstein proposed that:
[I]n a manner similar to the "Clipper Chip" or to emerging
technologies used to trace financial transactions, the federal
government could mandate the inclusion in all new computers of
technology which creates a unique and indelible signature on each
outgoing message. This would enable the information to be traced
to its original source no matter what steps are taken to ensure
anonymity en route.167
This school of thought will fail miserably in achieving even a small
portion of its goals, because any system involving true identities of people
passing through anonymous remailers must be a completely voluntary
system in order to work. However, this ignores the basic concept of how
remailers operate; remailers copy the contents of an incoming text message
and paste them into a new outgoing message. All signatures, addresses, and
identifying marks are discarded. Nothing in the outgoing message can be
"traced to the original source," regardless of the government-mandated
chip contained in the original source computer. To his credit, Edelstein did
recognize "a number of [additional] drawbacks" to his proposal, including
the ever-present danger of the proposed technology being superceded by
new technology, and "the possibility that the veil of privacy might be
breached by parties other than those authorized to penetrate it."' 68
B. Forced User-Log Proposal
Another related school of thought proposes that the government should
give limited liability to all remailer operators that keep user logs and
"'pierce the pseudonymity veil"" 69 to expose individual offenders to the
proper authorities. Noah Levine believes that truly anonymous remailers are

167. Edelstein, supra note 29, at 282.
168. Edelstein, supra note 29, at 283.
169. Post, supra note 41, at 160.
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operated "irresponsibly" because they do not keep user logs. 7 ° He
proposes that remailer administrators be subjected "to liability for the illegal
acts of their users in those circumstances where responsible administration
would have prevented the acts in the first place."' .7 Although Levine agrees
that a safe harbor provision is warranted, he feels that it should only be
provided to "those administrators who, acting in good
faith, voluntarily
172
choose to reveal the identity of the culpable user."'
David Post also believes that remailers should keep user logs:
Because of the key role that rules regarding intermediary liability
play and will play in cyberspace, and the critical importance of
traceability in determining whether pseudonymity plays an effective
role in limiting liability, it is likely that whatever regulation is
imposed in an attempt to control anonymous or pseudonymous
communications will be imposed on network intermediaries through,
for example, rules regarding their duty (a) to collect verifiable
identifying information from subscribers, (b) to turn over that
information in specified circumstances, and (c) to refuse to carry
communication that
come from systems that do not abide by similar
73
traceability rules.
Although Levine's and Post's proposals may work for the very first
offense on any given remailer system (before any user discovered that logs
were being kept), they would effectively turn a truly anonymous remailer
into a pseudo-anonymous remailer. While these policies may be good for
people who want to act pseudo-anonymously, seekers of true anonymity
will cease to use the remailers. Furthermore, operators are loathe to break
one ofthe cardinal remailer rules against maintaining user logs. Therefore,
Levine's and Post's proposals fail to address the problem of liability for
truly anonymous remailer operators.
C. One- World Government Proposal
One final school of thought sees a "simpler solution" than the thorny
issues of forcing spy chips or keeping user logs: it proposes the creation of
an international governing body that would "promulgate rules and
regulations governing Internet communication .... As such, this body
would have the ultimate authority in determining what acts on the Internet
are actionable. To deny the need for such an organization would, in effect,

170.
171.
172.
173.

Levine, supra note 39, at 1557.
Id. at 1558.
Id.
Post, supra note 41.
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allow the festering of this growing international problem." 74 This proposal
is highly flawed for several reasons, including the fact that the world is not
yet ready to create an "ultimate Internet authority," and the fact that
regardless of any agreement this improbable governing body could
eventually reach, it would have absolutely no physical ability to govern
global anonymous communication on the Internet or catch first-time
offenders.
D. No Satisfactory Fix-All Response Exists
The third issue raised by my proposal of limited liability for remailer
operators then remains: how do we catch first-time anonymous offenders
without forcing operators to break one of the cardinal remailer rules? After
examining the issue extensively, I joined the fray and built upon scholarly
commentary with my own version of a remailer participation system that
both satisfies critics and does not force operators to break one of the
cardinal remailer rules. 75 However, based upon the flaws inherent in such
a system, I conclude that no satisfactory fix-all response exists. Although
I consider my hybrid-system to be more effective than the proposals of
leading scholars, it functions only marginally better in reality, which is to
say that it misses the mark. For the sake of discussion, I point out the easily
identifiable fact that my hybrid-system faces two common yet
insurmountable hurdles.
First, despite the fact that no cardinal remailer rules are broken,
remailers using this system are not true anonymity remailers. Therefore,
people looking for true anonymity would be strongly averse to sending
messages across these remailers.
Second, can or should people trust the governmental agency in charge
of dispensing the decryption key? This goes against conventional wisdom,

174. Spencer, supra note 40, at 39.
175. Because no true anonymity remailer monitors message content or keeps user logs, I
proposed that a message sender's true identity (or at least the originating email address) be
encrypted by the first remailer in the chain, and sent along with the message. The only entity that
would hold the decryption key would be a government agency; remailers would be utterly unable
to comply in any meaningful way with a subpoena seeking the sender's identity. The government
agency in charge of holding the decryption key would only relinquish it to the injured party via
court order. This proposal satisfies many opponents to limiting remailer liability, because it
enables the general public to use remailers and send nearly anonymous messages while
maintaining the potential to hold first-time offenders accountable for their actions. However,
remailer operators and remailer users would most likely be horrified by this system.
I originally proposed this hybrid system in a different context: as a supplement to a narrowly
tailored, constitutionally permissible statutory template aimed at criminalizing specific forms of
unconstitutional anonymous speech. For more details regarding the legal ramifications of this
hybrid key-encryption system, see du Pont, supra note 43.
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as authors of messages containing protected political speech could unjustly
be in danger of exposure. 76
For these two reasons alone, I choose not to promote any such system,
regardless of whether or not it breaks a cardinal remailer rule, as a means
towards catching first-time offenders. My hybrid-system example proves
that no such system will consistently work for people wishing to send truly
anonymous messages. Therefore, some other way to catch first-time
offenders must be implemented; I firmly believe that the need to catch
anonymous abusers after their first offense is as high a priority as the need
for limited liability for truly anonymous remailer operators.
For example, anonymous abusers such as child pornographers should be
caught immediately (and punished harshly) before they can commit repeat
offenses. However, a guaranteethat all first-time abusers be caught bars
the possibility of the existence of truly anonymous remailers; the second
cannot realistically exist in conjunction with the first.
Therefore, a compromise between the two needs must be reached. This
compromise must reflect a realistic attempt to catch first-time abusers,
while at the same time enabling truly anonymous, easily-accessible remailers
to exist and providing their operators with limited liability. Because
remailers will be willing to coordinate their efforts, band together with the
government and help track down anonymous abusers in exchange for the
privilege of limited liability, my corporate structure/ safe-harbor proposal
is the best solution to the many problems of anonymity in cyberspace.
VII. CONCLUSION
Anonymity is an absolutely necessary and protected right. Despite
advances in peer-based networks, remailers provide the best form of
anonymity in cyberspace. However, user-friendly true anonymity
remailers are in danger because remailer operators do not have limited
liability. Caselaw interpreting the CDA limits ISP liability. This limited
liability should be extended to remailers as well.

176. This hurdle is the same one as addressed by Edelstein in his proposal. See Edelstein,
supra note 29, at 283.
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No one can prevent1 77 the sending of anonymous messages, and no
government can regulate the creation of hidden, truly anonymous remailers.
Ifremailers are not permitted in the United States, they can, and surely will,
be easily created "offshore," or in countries that do not have extradition
treaties with the United States. 78 As Edelstein points out, "it is much easier
to establish an anonymous remailer than it is to set up a financial institution,
179
and the 'paper trail' of an anonymous message is much easier to hide."'
Furthermore, if"an impoverished nation can be persuaded... to enact an
airtight computer secrecy law, the door will be opened to the creation of
'offshore databases' operated by local contacts for the benefit of organized
crime.180
It may not even take an "impoverished nation" to create an offshore
remailer; on March 6,2001, a young Canadian entrepreneur named Matt
Goyer announced that he intended to build "an offshore Napster that
couldn't be touched by the U.S. Government" on the "quasi-independent
principality" of Sealand. Located in the North Sea, Sealand is a deserted
military base founded by "the self-proclaimed Prince Roy" in 1967.
Apparently, Prince Roy won the rights to Sealand after prolonged litigation
with Great Britain. Goyer believes that only $15,000 is needed to set up
shop and start his Napster clone.'
Without limited liability for user-friendly remailers that can be easily
utilized by the general public, most truly anonymous messages will either
be sent by criminals who understand how to create their own remailers, 82
or through offshore remailers that have no intention of working with

177. The concepts of "prevention" and "regulation," are broad and undefined. For example,
despite the fact that "Congress has already failed in its efforts to protect minors from the rampant
availability of pornography on the Internet," (See Harvard Law Review, supra note 162, at 1583.),
the most effective form of prevention in this case is parental oversight. Compared to parental
regulation of pornography entering a house, congressional regulation is nearly useless. This
example illustrates how one form of prevention taken by a single individual can be far more
effective than other forms taken by large governmental bodies.
178. Spencer notes that "a serious concern arises when [an anonymous remailer] exists
outside of United States jurisdiction," because of the decreased possibility that the government
could "pursue" the remailer operator in order to force it to disclose the name of the anonymous
abuser. See Spencer, supranote 40, at 25. While I agree that remailer operators need an incentive
to remain in the United States, I do not believe that "pursuit" of remailer operators per se is the
most effective method of combating anonymous abuses.
179. Edelstein, supranote 29, at 280-81 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 266.
181. See Richard Stenger, EntrepreneurProposes Offshore Napster Clone, CNN.com, 9
(2001), availableat http://www.cnn.com/200 lITECH/internet/03/03/napster.offshorelindex.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
182. Edelstein notes that "the next logical step" for criminals who need but cannot access
truly anonymous remailers "is to establish their own anonymous remailers for the sole purpose of
conducting illegal activities." Edelstein, supranote 29, at 265.
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foreign governments to trap repeat offenders. However, with limited
liability and safe harbors, remailer operators have an exceptionally strong
incentive to work together to catch anonymous abusers. While it will
remain impossible to catch all first-time offenders who use anonymity
systems, my proposal is the best solution because it turns otherwise
renegade remailer operators into communitarian allies. Therefore, for the
good of society and for the sake of constitutionally protected anonymous
speech in cyberspace, the United States must provide a safe harbor for
remailer operators by providing them with limited liability.

